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Self-reflection can be defined as a temporary phenomenological experience in which 
self becomes an object to oneself. According to theorists like Mead and Vygotsky, 
self-reflection is a defining feature of humans, and fundamental to the higher mental 
functions. Central to a socio-cultural perspective is the idea that this distancing, from 
both self and the immediate situation, occurs through the use of semiotic mediators 
(Valsiner, 1998). Naming (i.e., using a semiotic mediator to pick out) an affective 
experience or a situation distances the individual from that experience or situation. 
Furthermore, such distance enables self to act upon self and the situation. For 
example, in order to obtain dinner one must first name either one’s hunger or the fact 
that it is dinner time. This naming, which is a moment of self-reflection, is the first 
step in beginning to construct, semiotically, a path of action that will lead to dinner.  
What triggers this process of semiotic mediation? Exactly how do semiotic 
mediators enable distancing in general, and self-reflection in particular? What is it in 
the structure of semiotic mediators, or signs, that enables this ‘stepping out’ from 
immediate experience? And how are these signs combined into complex semiotic 
systems (representations, discourses, cultural artifacts or symbolic resources) that 
provide even greater liberation from the immediate situation? 
In order to address these questions the present chapter begins with a review of 
socio-cultural theories of the origins self-reflection. Four types of theory can be 
distinguished: rupture theories, mirror theories, conflict theories and internalization 
theories. In order to address the limitations of these theories, Mead’s theory of the 
social act is advanced. These theories are then evaluated against an empirical instance 
of self-reflection and a novel conception of complex semiotic systems is proposed. 
 
<A> Rupture Theories 
Rupture theories of self-reflection posit that self-reflection arises when one’s path of 
action becomes blocked or when one faces a decision of some sort. Peirce provides an 
early articulation of this idea: 
 
If for instance, in a horse-car, I pull out my purse and find a five-cent nickel 
and five coppers, I decide, while my hand is going to the purse, in which way I 
will pay my fare. […] To speak of such a doubt as causing an irritation which 
needs to be appeased, suggests a temper which is uncomfortable to the verge 
of insanity. Yet looking at the matter minutely, it must be admitted that, if 
there is the least hesitation as to whether I shall pay the five coppers or the 
nickel (as there will sure to be, unless I act from some previously contracted 
habit in the matter), though irritation is too strong a word, yet I am excited to 
such small mental activities as may be necessary in deciding how I shall act. 
[…] Images pass rapidly through consciousness, one incessantly melting into 
another, until at last, when all is over – it may be in a fraction of a second, in 
an hour, or after long years – we find ourselves decided as to how we should 
act (1878/1998, p.141-2) 
 
According to Peirce, the problematic situation stimulates reflective thought. Even a 
small irritation, or rupture, can stimulate a stream of thought. This is a 
phenomenological experience that many people would be inclined to agree with. But 
why should a rupture spontaneously generate the semiotic system necessary for 
distancing? 
Dewey (1896), developing Peirce’s ideas, argued that in the ruptured situation 
the object ceases, from the perspective of the actor, to be objective and becomes, so to 
speak, subjective. Specifically, the object becomes subjective because the actor has 
two or more responses toward the object. Dewey gives the example of a child 
reaching for a flame. The child is attracted to the flame because it looks like 
something to play with; but the child is also afraid of the flame because of a previous 
burn. Thus there are two contradictory responses in the child: to reach toward the 
flame and to withdraw from the flame. It is due to the disjunction between these two 
responses, Dewey argues, that self-reflection arises. 
Mead (1910) criticized this theory arguing that there is nothing in having two 
contradictory responses which necessarily leads to self-reflection. In non-human 
animals there are conflicting responses, yet there is no self-consciousness. Pavlov 
(1951), for example, trained dogs to salivate upon seeing a circle, and not to salivate 
upon seeing an ellipse. In successive trials he reduced the difference between the two 
contradictory stimuli, until the ellipse was almost a circle. When the stimuli became 
difficult to differentiate, thus evoking two contradictory responses, the dogs, usually 
placid, became frantic and remained disturbed for weeks afterward. Pavlov called this 
‘experimental neurosis.’ Assuming that these dogs did not become self-reflective (and 
there is no evidence to suggest they did), then these experiments show that 
contradictory responses can co-exist without leading to self-reflection. 
Piaget (1970) offers a more contemporary variant of the rupture theory. 
According to Piaget the child is forced to abstract and reorganize his/her developing 
schemas when those schemas lead to unfulfilled expectations. For example, the child 
expects the consequence of action X to be Y, but instead the consequence of action X 
is Z. Like the other rupture theorists, Piaget points to a proximal cause of self-
reflection, namely a problematic situation, but he does not give us much purchase on 
the semiotic processes through which self-reflection arises. Again one can ask, why 
should a rupture stimulate the emergence of semiotic mediators? In order to address 
this question we need to move beyond the subject-object relation that Peirce, Dewey 
and Piaget were working with, and examine the self-other social relation. 
 
<A> Mirror Theories 
The defining feature of mirror theories of self-reflection, compared to the rupture 
theories, is the presence of an other. These theories assume that the other perceives 
more about self than self can perceive. The reflective distance from self which self-
reflection entails first exists in the mind of other. This ‘surplus’ (Bakhtin, 1923/1990; 
Gillespie, 2003) can be fed back to self by other, such that self can learn to see self 
from the perspective of other. In this sense, mirror theories assume that the other 
provides feedback to self in the same way that a mirror provides feedback about 
appearance that we cannot perceive unaided. An early variant of this theory can be 
found in the writings of Adam Smith: 
 
Were it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some 
solitary place, without any communication with his own species, he could no 
more think of his own character, of the propriety or demerit of his own 
sentiments and conduct, of the beauty or deformity of his own mind, than the 
beauty or deformity of his own face. All of these are objects which he cannot 
easily see, which naturally he does not look at, and with regard to which he is 
provided with no mirror which can present them to his view. Bring him into 
society, and he is immediately provided with the mirror which he wanted 
before. It is placed in the countenance and behaviour of those he lives with. 
(1759/1982, p.110) 
 
For Adam Smith it is “fellow man” who teaches self the value of self’s actions, who is 
a “mirror” redirecting self’s attention to the meaning of self’s own actions. Growing 
up alone, without such a mirror, Smith writes, there is nothing to make a person 
reflect upon him/herself. The “mirror” is the “countenance and behaviour” of other.  
The metaphor of society as a mirror, leading to self-reflection, was elaborated 
in Cooley’s (1902, p.184) concept of the “looking-glass self.” According to Cooley, 
the self is a social product formed out of three elements: “the imagination of our 
appearance to the other person; the imagination of his judgment of that appearance, 
and some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification.” Interestingly, self-
reflection for Cooley is always entwined with judgments, leading to emotions such as 
pride, shame, guilt or gloating. Unfortunately, much of the literature which has taken 
up Cooley’s ideas has become mired in examining the extent to which self is 
‘actually’ able to take the perspective of the other (Shrauger & Schoeneman, 1979; 
Lundgren, 2004). 
Psychoanalysts, on the other hand, have bypassed this trivial question, and 
have developed a sophisticated theory based on the mirror metaphor. According to 
Lacan (1949), before the mirror stage the child is fragmented: feelings, desires and 
actions are unconnected. Within this scheme the mirror reveals the child to 
him/herself as a bounded totality, a gestalt. The self, by perceiving itself as bounded, 
and thus isolated, becomes alienated through self-reflection. This idea of mirroring is 
still current in psychoanalytic theories of child development (e.g., Gergely & Watson, 
1996). 
The feedback theories, despite articulating a proximal cause of self-reflection, 
encounter three problems if extended into a theory of the origin and nature of self-
reflection. First, many non-human animals live in complex societies, and are 
constantly exposed to feedback from others, yet they do not have a consciousness of 
self. Presumably the difference between humans and other animals is that humans 
take the perspective of the other in the mirroring process. However, this only raises 
the second problem, namely, how does self take the perspective of the other? This 
seems to be assumed rather than explained. The third problem is the apparently 
neutral nature of the other in mirror theories. The idea that the other is a passive 
mirror, neutrally reflecting self back to self, is problematized by the third group of 
theories dealing with self-reflection, namely, the conflict theories.  
 
<A> Conflict Theories 
According to the conflict theories, self-reflection arises through a social struggle. 
Hegel’s theory of self-consciousness as exemplified in the master-slave allegory is a 
paradigmatic example (Marková, 1982). Self-consciousness, Hegel argues, arises 
through gaining recognition from an other who is not inferior to self. According to the 
master-slave allegory, initially, self and other treat each other as physical objects, and 
thus deny any recognition to each other. Due to this mutual denial, self and other enter 
into a struggle, the outcome of which is a relation of domination and subordination, 
i.e., the master-slave relation. The master dominates the slave and in that sense is free, 
while the slave, having lost the struggle, is in bondage to the master and is, thus, not 
free. The slave is in the service of the master and sees the master as superior, while 
the master sees the slave as inferior. According to Hegel’s logic of recognition, the 
paradoxical outcome of this situation is that the slave can get recognition from the 
master, but the master cannot get recognition from the slave. The slave struggles for 
recognition from the master and thus works toward increased self-consciousness and 
eventually equality with the master. The master, on the other hand, cannot satisfy the 
need for recognition because recognition by the slave is worthless. The interesting 
dynamic that Hegel describes is that self-consciousness, and thus self-reflection, arise 
through struggling for recognition from the other. In socio-cultural psychology one 
can find variations on this basic idea at the levels of interaction, institution and 
representation. 
At the interactional level, for example, the tradition of research on socio-
cognitive conflict has clearly established that conflict between self and other over how 
to proceed in a joint task can lead to cognitive development (Doise & Mugny, 1984). 
Moreover, recent research has shown that a key component of durable cognitive 
development results from social interaction that takes the form of ‘explicit 
recognition’ (Psaltis & Duveen, under review), which is defined as the interaction or 
conversation where new acquired knowledge for self is recognized by other and self. 
Sigel’s Psychological Distancing Theory expresses a similar dynamic. Sigel (2002, 
p.197-8) asserts that discrepancies introduced by the utterances of others can put a 
cognitive demand on the child which can in turn lead to representational work and 
thus distancing. 
Moving to the institutional level, activity theorists posit that contradictions 
between different components of an activity system lead to reflection. Activity Theory 
has much in common with Dewey’s ideas (Tolman & Piekkola, 1989), but it differs 
from Dewey by extending the definition of the problematic situation to include 
problems introduced by the perspective of others. This is quite clear in Engeström’s 
(1987) concept of ‘expansive learning,’ which refers to participants within an activity 
system prompting each other to reflect upon the conditions and rules of their ongoing 
interaction. The roots of expansive learning are to be found in “disturbances, ruptures 
and expansions” which arise in communication within an activity system (Engeström 
et al., 1997 p.373). 
Finally, at the level of representation, recent work in social representations 
theory emphasizes the contradictions between different bodies of knowledge 
circulating in modern societies (Moscovici, 1984; Duveen, chapter X). Bauer and 
Gaskell (1999) argue that people become aware of representations at the points at 
which they overlap or contradict each other. “It is through the contrast of divergent 
perspectives that we become aware of representations, particularly when the contrast 
challenges our presumed reality” (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999, p.169). Divergent 
representations, sustained by different groups, in different domains of practice, can 
come together and clash in the public sphere (Jovchelovitch, 1995). When this occurs, 
individuals and groups may come to participate in conflicting representations. 
According to Bauer and Gaskell, it is this conflict which produces awareness of 
representations. This co-existence of multiple forms of knowledge in society, and 
consequently, in the individual minds of members of society engenders a state of 
‘cognitive polyphasia’ (e.g. Wagner et al., 1999), which can, but does not necessarily, 
lead to self-reflection. 
Examining the conflict theories critically, one could say that they have the 
same basic structure as the rupture theories. In the rupture theories, tension is 
introduced through a problematic self-object relation, while in the conflict theories 
tension is introduced through a problematic self-other relation. In both cases the 
dynamic is similar, and thus the conflict theories are vulnerable to the same critiques 
as are posed to the rupture theories, namely, they identify a proximal cause of self-
reflection (i.e., social conflict), but do little to elucidate the actual semiotic process 
through which self-reflection arises. The question to ask is: what is it about the social 
situation (self-other relation) that is not present in the practical situation (self-object 
relation) and which can account for the process of self-reflection? One possible 
answer to this question is provided by the internalization theories.  
 
<A> Internalization Theories 
The idea that thought is a self-reflective internal dialogue with absent others goes 
back, at least, to Plato (e.g., Sophist, 263e; Theaetetus, 190). Forms of internalization 
are evident in the theories of Freud (in the formation of the superego), Bakhtin and 
Vygotsky. Today this line of theory is carried forward by Hermans (2001), and 
Josephs (2002). Within this line of theorizing, one can conceptualize self-reflection as 
arising through internalizing the perspective that the other has upon self, followed by 
self taking the perspective of other upon self. Or more generally, one could think of 
self-reflection as arising through the internal dialogue between internalized 
perspectives. 
There are, however, problems over how the metaphor of ‘internalization’ 
should be understood (Matusov, 1998). Wertsch (1985, p.163) has called the idea that 
social relations are simply ‘transmitted’ into psychological structure “uninteresting 
and trivial.” While some theorists make this mistake, Vygotsky (1997, p.106) himself 
emphasized that the process of internalization is a process of “transformation”, rather 
than simple ‘transmission’ (see also Lawrence and Valsiner, 1993). The process of 
transformation is clearly evident Vygotsky’s analysis of the emergence of pointing 
(1997, p.104-5). 
According to Vygotsky, the child becomes able to point only when he/she is 
able to reflect upon the meaning of the pointing from the standpoint of others. How 
does this come about? “Initially,” Vygotsky (1997, p.104) writes, “the pointing 
gesture represents a simply unsuccessful grasping movement directed toward an 
object and denoting a future action.” At first the child is not self-conscious of 
pointing, and thus is not trying to communicate anything. Rather, the child is simply 
reaching for something out of reach. However, from the perspective of the mother, the 
child’s reaching is meaningful, it indicates that the child desires the reached-for 
object. Vygotsky (p.105) states: “In response to the unsuccessful grasping movement 
of the child, there arises a reaction not on the part of the object, but on the part of an 
other person.” The grasping first has the meaning of pointing for the mother, and only 
later has meaning for the child. It is only when the grasping becomes a meaningful 
gesture for the child that we can say the child is pointing, for it is only then that the 
child knows the meaning of his/her gesture for others. The child, Vygotsky (p.105) 
writes, “becomes for himself what he is in himself through what he manifests for 
others.” That is to say, the child becomes self-aware of his/her own being through 
how he/she appears to others. 
Summarizing the emergence of self-reflective meaning through 
internalization, Vygotsky (1997, p.105) writes: “Every higher mental function was 
external because it was social before it became an internal, strictly mental function; it 
was formerly a social relation of two people.” Social relations, like conversations, 
become internalized and constitute the higher mental functions. Self-reflection, for 
example, can be understood as a change of perspective within the individual 
(analogous to the change of perspective between people taking turns in a 
conversation). “I relate to myself as people related to me. Reflection is a dispute” 
(Vygotsky, 1989, p.56-7). 
The tale that turns grasping into pointing can also be used to articulate 
Vygotsky’s concept of the sign. According to Vygotsky (1997), signs are first used to 
mediate the behavior of others, and are later used to talk about self, reflect upon self 
and mediate the behavior of self. The child learns to point, first in order to direct the 
attention of others, and later to direct his own attention (for example, using his/her 
finger to keep his/her eyes focused upon the text). Equally, the child learns to ask 
questions of others before he/she asks questions of him/herself. But what is it in the 
structure of the sign that enables humans, on the one hand to communicate, and on the 
other hand to self-reflect? 
The difference between grasping and pointing is that grasping is a response (to 
the stimulus of the desired object), while pointing is a response that is also a stimulus 
to both self and other. While grasping may be a stimulus to other, it is not a stimulus 
to self. Pointing becomes a sign when it is not just a response but also a stimulus to 
self in the same way that it is a stimulus to other. Thus, signs differ from other stimuli 
because “they have a reverse action”, that is, signs are responses which can also be 
stimuli (Vygotsky & Luria, 1994, p.143). The classic example of “reverse action” is 
tying a knot in a handkerchief as a mnemonic aid. Self ties a knot in a handkerchief (a 
response), so that later, the knot will function as a stimulus, reminding self that 
something must be remembered.  The idea of “reverse action” is fundamental to 
Vygotsky’s concept of the sign, which he initially theorized as a “reversible reflex” 
(1925/1999). 
Only human actions and their products possess the key property of “reverse 
action.” A naturally occurring tree might be a stimulus, but it is not a response. A dog 
might bare its teeth in response to the stimulus of a wolf. The baring of teeth may be a 
stimulus to the wolf, but it will never become a stimulus to the dog itself. A human’s 
angry gesture is a response which may become a stimulus to the other. But crucially, 
the angry gesture may also become a stimulus to self, in the same way that it is a 
stimulus to other. To the other person the angry gesture may be evidence of an 
impulsive personality, and self may also become aware of this possible meaning of 
his/her angry gesture. If the gesture becomes a stimulus with the same meaning for 
self as it has for other, then it is a sign.   
Vygotsky’s conception of the sign is astonishingly close to Mead’s concept of 
the significant symbol. Mead (1922) defines the significant symbol as a gesture which 
self experiences both from the perspective of self and from the perspective of other. 
As Mead (p.161) writes: “It is through the ability to be the other at the same time that 
he is himself that the symbol becomes significant.” The key point of similarity is that 
both Mead and Vygotsky conceive of the sign (or significant symbol) as comprising 
two perspectives. On the one hand there is the embodied actor perspective (the 
response) toward some object (e.g., the reaching child desires the object). On the 
other hand there is the distance introduced by the observer perspective of the other on 
the action (e.g., the mother sees the child’s grasping as indicating desire). When the 
child takes both his/her own grasping perspective and the mothers perspective toward 
that grasping, then the grasping becomes pointing. Thus there is an equivalence 
between Vygotsky’s concept of “reverse action” and Mead’s concept of taking the 
perspective of the other.  
Vygotsky’s theory of the sign, and Mead’s theory of the significant symbol, 
are fundamentally different from the theories of Peirce, Saussure, Bühler, and Morris 
(Gillespie, 2005). The latter all have monological theories of the sign. Simply put, 
they conceive of the sign as representing something or some relation to the world. 
However, according to the present reading of Vygotsky and Mead, the sign (or 
significant symbol) is a composite of two different perspectives, namely, an actor 
perspective and an observer perspective. Thus the sign (or significant symbol) is 
fundamentally intersubjective: it evokes both actor and observer perspectives in both 
self and other. 
The fruitful consequences of the present conception of the sign are 
immediately evident when one tries to explain the role of the sign in either 
empathizing or self-reflection. In empathy, the sign carries the empathizer from an 
observer perspective (on, for example, the suffering of the other) to an actor 
perspective (participating in that suffering). In self-reflection, or distanciation, the 
sign carries the person from an actor perspective (a fully absorbed action orientation 
toward something) to an observer perspective (reacting to the absorbed action 
orientation). 
In the context of the present review of theories of self-reflection, Vygotsky’s 
theory of the sign, and Mead’s concept of the significant symbol, are landmark 
contributions, because both theories specify precisely the semiotic structure that can 
account for self-reflection. However, a lacuna remains. How does the child come to 
react to his/her own grasping in the same way that the mother responds? If the sign is 
a composite of the perspectives of self and other, then how does this composite form? 
How are these two perspectives brought together? In order to address this question we 
need to turn to Mead’s theory of the social act. 
 <A> The Social Act 
Mead’s theory of the social act is a theory of institutional structures (Gillespie, 2005). 
The first defining feature of humans for Mead is that they move amongst positions 
within a relatively stable social, or institutional, structure. Of course social structure is 
not unique to humans. Within an ant colony one will find the queen, workers, 
foragers, nurses and soldiers. But it is not simply the existence of social structure that 
is fundamental for Mead. Rather, it is position exchange within the institutional 
structure. In non-human societies there is a division of labor, but there is never 
frequent position exchange. However, humans frequently exchange position within 
institutional structures. For example, people sometimes host parties and at other times 
attend parties. The perspectives of host and guest are quite divergent. If these social 
positions were never exchanged, or reversed, then it is unlikely that either would be 
able to take the perspective of the other. However, because people are sometimes 
hosts and sometimes guests this means that most adults have experience of both 
perspectives, and thus are able to take the perspective of the other when they are in 
either social position.  
Additional social acts in which frequent position exchange occurs include: 
buying/selling, giving/receiving, suffering/helping, grieving/consoling, 
teaching/learning, ordering/obeying, winning/losing, and stealing/punishing. Each of 
these social acts entails reciprocal actor and observer positions, and importantly, 
because most people have had enacted both social positions, they have the both the 
actor and observer perspectives for each social act and thus are able to take the 
perspective of each other within a social act. Returning to the example of pointing, the 
child cannot learn the meaning of his/her own pointing without first having been in 
the social position of responding to the pointing of others. 
However, having previously been in the social position of the other, within a 
social act, does not mean that self will necessarily take the perspective of the other. 
Why should the perspective of other be evoked in self when self is not in the social 
position of the other? The problem is that most of the stimuli for self and other are 
quite divergent. The child, who desires the object and is grasping toward it, is in a 
completely different situation to the mother, who is attentive to the child’s grasping. 
Even if the child had previously responded to the grasping of others, why should the 
child now respond to his/her own grasping? The feeling of grasping is quite different 
to the sight of someone else grasping. What is common in these two situations that 
could serve to unite these two perspectives in the mind of the child? Mead (Mead, 
1912; Farr, 1997) points to the peculiar significance of the vocal gesture. Stimuli in 
the auditory modality (like vocal gestures) sound the same for self as they do for 
other. Accordingly, the vocal gesture is ideally poised to integrate both actor and 
observer perspectives. Because self hears self speak in the same way that self hears 
other speak, so self can react to self’s utterances in the same way that self reacts to 
other. 
It is often asserted that self and other co-emerge in ontogenesis. For example, 
Baldwin (1906, p.321) famously wrote that: “The Ego and the Alter are thus born 
together.” However, Mead would disagree with this, arguing that the other exists for 
self before self exists for self. First self reacts to other, then self changes social 
position with the other, and finally self is able to react to self (in the same way that 
self previously reacted to other). Empirical evidence for rejecting the co-emergence 
thesis, in favor of Mead’s theory, is found in studies of children’s use of words 
denoting self and other, which have shown that children talk about other before 
talking about self (e.g., Cooley, 1908; Bain, 1936). 
Mead’s theory of the social act fits closely with his theory of the significant 
symbol. The structure of the significant symbol (or sign) is a pairing of an actor 
perspective engaged in some action with an observer perspective reacting to that 
action. The social act is the institution that firstly provides individuals with roughly 
equivalent actor and observer experiences, and secondly, integrates these perspectives 
within the minds of individuals. 
When both actor and observer perspectives within the significant symbol (or 
sign) are evoked, then there is self-reflection, because self is both self and other 
simultaneously. The question then is: what can trigger this double evocation? Simply, 
there are two ways in which self can arrive at an observer perspective on self (i.e., 
self-reflection). The process can begin with either an actor perspective engaged in 
some action, or an observer perspective on someone else’s action. Either of these 
perspectives can evoke, via the structure of the significant symbol (or sign), the 
complementary actor and observer perspectives, thus leading to self-reflection. Self-
reflection triggered by an actor perspective I call self-mediation. Self-reflection 
triggered by an observer perspective on an actor I call short-circuiting. The next 
section illustrates these two forms of self-reflection. 
 
<A> Two Processes Of Self-Reflection: An Illustration 
The following analysis is taken from a study on the interactions between tourists and 
Ladakhis, in northern India (Gillespie, forthcoming). Ladakh, on the border of Tibet, 
is a popular backpacker destination. Tourists are led to Ladakh by representations of 
the Himalayan mountains, spirituality and traditional culture. Usually the tourists in 
Ladakh reject the idea of package tourism, and claim to be searching for something 
more authentic. In the following exchange, an English university student is 
explaining, to me and another tourist, how she wants to have an authentic experience 
of Ladakh: 
 
Laura: I wanted to come up here for longer, to do voluntary work, to be more 
part of it, rather than just a tourist passing through, taking photos and buying 
things, eh, eh, I am quite disappointed I haven’t, I don’t know, eh, in eight 
days you can’t, em, […] it’s just, having been with a family in the first place, I 
now want everything to be personal, to see proper India rather than just the 
India that everyone - that sounds rather clichéd - but that tourists see (pause) - 
(sigh) so I am a tourist really 
 
The actor perspective that Laura is initially embedded in is that of wanting “to be 
more part of” Indian life, and wanting “to see proper India.” This desire for an 
authentic experience is positioned against the other tourists who are merely “passing 
through” and touring “the India that everyone […] sees.” Before travelling to Ladakh 
Laura had spent two months in south India, living with an Indian family, and thus 
having seen the “proper India.” Although she had planned to stay in Ladakh for 
longer, and even do voluntary work, she is now planning to leave Ladakh after just 
eight days. Accordingly, it is difficult for her to claim the position of someone who 
has experienced the “proper” Ladakh. The reality is that she, like the other tourists, is 
merely “passing through.” The contradiction becomes apparent and leads to two inter-
related, but theoretically distinct, movements of self-reflection: self-mediation and 
short-circuiting. 
 <B> Self-Mediation 
The first movement of self-reflection, which culminates in the utterance “that sounds 
rather clichéd,” is quite straightforward. Laura begins in the actor perspective of 
wanting an authentic experience of India and Ladakh, and then, in the self-reflective 
utterance (“that sounds rather clichéd”) switches to an observer perspective on her 
previous actor perspective. She ends up reflecting upon herself, suggesting that such a 
search for the “proper” Ladakh is in fact a tourist cliché. How can this self-mediation 
be explained?  
The rupture theories are obviously inadequate, because there is no pragmatic 
subject-object rupture. The mirror theories have more to contribute, because this self-
reflection is embedded in a social situation. Laura is speaking to me and another 
tourist, and her self-reflection may have been stimulated by social feedback. For 
example, she may have perceived skeptical looks concerning her search for 
authenticity, thus triggering this self-reflection. But the feedback she received was not 
neutral. Her utterance (“that sounds rather clichéd”) is pejorative. Such a cliché is an 
embarrassment. Thus we could describe Laura as struggling for recognition from her 
audience. However, such an analysis, while insightful, does not explain the semiotic 
process underlying Laura’s self-reflection. The internalization theories, on the other 
hand, do provide a model. According to these theories one could argue that Laura 
became self-aware by taking the perspective of her audience. But how does she take 
the perspective of her audience? The answer is to be found in Mead’s concept of the 
vocal gesture. 
Laura’s phrase, “that sounds rather clichéd,” is particularly revealing because 
according to Mead it is precisely the sound of her previous utterances that trigger self-
reflection. The peculiar significance of vocal gestures is that they sound the same to 
self as they do to other. Laura hears her own utterances (expressing a desire to see the 
“proper India”) in the same way as her audience. Accordingly, she is able to react to 
her own utterance as if it were the utterance of an other. Presumably, if Laura heard 
another tourist talking about finding the “proper India” she would think that it 
sounded clichéd. Using Vygotsky’s terminology, one could say that Laura’s initial 
utterance is not only a response to my question, it is also a stimulus to herself. In 
short, she becomes self-aware because she reacts to herself in the same way that she 
reacts to others. The key process underling this instance of self-reflection is a 
movement from an actor perspective to an observer perspective on self. The vocal 
gesture is the semiotic means that carries Laura from being embedded in an actor 
perspective (searching for the “proper” India), to an observer perspective upon herself 
(that what she says sounds clichéd). 
 
<B> Short-Circuiting 
The second movement of self-reflection culminates in the utterance, “so I am a tourist 
really.” This movement begins with the contradiction between Laura’s criticism of 
tourists “passing through, taking photos and buying things” and the fact that she only 
spent eight days in Ladakh (and, as she mentioned elsewhere, that she took many 
photos and bought many souvenirs). This movement is analytically distinct from the 
first instance of self-reflection, because here, the movement is from an observer 
perspective on other tourists (criticizing them for having a shallow experience) to an 
observer perspective on self (recognizing that self is the same as other). 
The rupture theories again are of little use in this analysis because there is no 
subject-object rupture. Both the mirror and conflict theories can contribute an 
understanding of the proximal cause of Laura’s self-reflection. One could speculate 
that the gaze of the audience made the contradiction salient, thus leading to a collapse 
of the self-other distinction. But again, this does not explain the semiotic process 
through which this might occur. Interestingly, the internalization theories also have 
little to contribute. Laura is not taking the perspective of the other, rather she is taking 
her own perspective upon the other tourists and turning this upon herself.  
Vygotsky’s theory of the sign and Mead’s theory of the significant symbol, 
however, can begin to unpack this movement of self-reflection. When Laura is 
criticizing the other tourists, she is using signs (or significant symbols) to describe the 
other. She says that other tourists are just “passing through, taking photos and buying 
things.” In the moment of speaking, Laura is blind to the fact that this is exactly what 
she has done. However, because signs are pairings of actor and observer perspectives, 
describing the other always evokes an empathetic actor response in self. In Laura’s 
case, this empathetic response ‘resonates’ with her own experiences. She hesitates 
(“eh, eh”) and begins to speak (“I am quite disappointed I haven’t”) and then hesitates 
again (“I don’t know, eh”) and finally we discover what it is that is welling up in her 
mind, namely, that she has only spent eight days in Ladakh (and was leaving the next 
day). The significance of this takes time to manifest explicitly, and when it does, 
Laura can only say that, despite her wishes, she is a tourist just like any other tourist 
in Ladakh (“so I am a tourist really”). I call this form of self-reflection ‘short-
circuiting,’ because it begins with an emphasis on the difference between self and 
other, and then this difference collapses and self becomes equivalent to other. 
Mead’s theory of the social act takes the analysis even further. Laura’s short-
circuit can only occur because of frequent exchange of social positions within the 
social act. If Laura had not been in the actual social position of the other tourists, if 
she had not been merely “passing through,” taking photos and buying souvenirs, then 
the self-reflection could not have occurred. Stating the case even more forcefully, 
position exchange is a necessary precondition for this type of self-reflection. In this 
type of self-reflection, one can see clearly that self and other do not co-emerge, as 
argued by Baldwin, but rather that the characteristics first associated with ‘they’ 
become recognized as characteristics of ‘me.’ First there is action, second, there is 
observing the other doing the same action, and finally, in the combination of these 
two perspectives, there is self-reflection. 
 
<A> Complex Semiotic Systems  
The analysis of Laura’s self-reflection, as outlined so far, could be criticized on two 
fronts: first it is too individualistic (isn’t Laura’s self-reflection part of a larger 
cultural pattern?), and second, it is overly concerned with individual signs (what about 
more complex semiotic systems?). Both of these criticisms are well placed. Laura is 
not the first tourist to hypocritically criticize other tourists (Prebensen et al., 2003). 
Moreover, Laura’s description of other tourists as just “passing through, taking photos 
and buying things” is a complex collective and historical product. Neither Vygotsky 
nor Mead provides an adequate theory of the more complex trans-individual semiotic 
systems that circulate in society. One of the significant advances of socio-cultural 
psychology, since the work of Mead and Vygotsky, has been the theorization of these 
complex semiotic systems in a variety of ways: as social representations (Moscovici, 
1984), cultural artifacts (Cole, 1996), symbolic resources (Zittoun et al., 2003; Zittoun 
chapter X), narratives (Bruner, 1986), interpretive repertoires (Potter & Wetherell, 
1987), and discourses with subject positions (Harré & Van Langehove, 1991). 
Laura participates in a collective and historical discourse that contains several 
subject positions. First, there is the subject position of the tourist dupe. This is the 
tourist who just passes through, takes photos and buys souvenirs. Most tourists 
willingly ascribe this subject position to other tourists, yet few ascribe this position to 
themselves. Instead, tourists try to occupy one of the more favorable subject positions, 
like that of adventurer, spiritual searcher, or reflexive post-tourist. Laura, for example, 
tries to occupy the position of having authentic encounters with the local population, 
as evidenced by her aspirations to do voluntary work and live with a local family. 
The question is: How can these complex semiotic systems be used to help 
explain the semiotics of self-reflection? The interesting thing about the discourse is 
not simply that it has several subject positions, but that Laura claims, in discourse, 
one position, while enacting, in action, a different position. On the one hand, Laura’s 
actions conform to typical tourist practices. She has been led, by various 
representations, to a tourist destination where the only obvious paths of action are to 
sightsee, take photos and buy souvenirs. On the other hand, Laura participates in a 
discourse that conceives of these typical tourist actions as shallow, and instead aspires 
to less attainable subject positions (i.e., having authentic encounters). Thus Laura is 
caught in a contradictory stream of cultural meanings. This collectively produced, and 
historically sustained, fault-line makes both self-mediation and short-circuiting 
immanent.  
Using the theory of the sign, outlined above, we can further this analysis. This 
fault-line in the cultural stream corresponds to the structure of the sign. The 
contradiction is between the semiotic guidance of tourist action (actor perspective) 
and the criticism of other tourists (observer perspective). There is, at the level of 
discourses and representations, then, a lack of integration between actor and observer 
perspectives. It must be emphasized that this is not simply a contradiction between 
two semiotic systems (i.e., a conflict theory of self-reflection), rather it concerns a 
very specific contradiction, namely between actor and observer perspectives. The 
position that self claims and the position that self enacts are disjunctive. This is what 
Ichheiser (1949) called a mote-beam divergence. The prevalence of this divergence 
reveals that the lack of integration between actor and observer perspectives is not 
simply something that occurs at the level of individual signs, but something that is 
played out in much more macro semiotic dynamics. The point, then, is that the 
structure of the sign (or significant symbol), is not only evident at the level of 
individual words or gestures, but is evident in the macro-structure of whole complex 
semiotic systems. 
 
<A> Conclusion 
Returning to the questions raised at the outset of this chapter, it is now possible to 
offer some concise answers. The proximal reasons for self-reflection are diverse. 
Humans can be led to self-reflection by ruptures (problems with the subject-object 
relation), social feedback (where the other acts as a mirror), social conflict (in the 
struggle for recognition) and internal dialogues (through internalizing the perspective 
of the other on self). Moreover, there is a cultural level to the analysis; the complex 
semiotic systems in which people are embedded contain contradictions that can make 
self-reflection immanent. However, fundamental to all these proximal causes of self-
reflection is the logic of the sign. 
Before the formation of the sign (or significant symbol) there is 
undifferentiated experience (level 0 experience in Valsiner’s (2001) terminology). But 
this experience is structured by social acts: it contains experience belonging to both 
actor and observer perspectives. The magic of the social act is that it integrates these 
actor and observer experiences, or perspectives, into the formation of signs. 
Conceiving of the sign as this integration of perspectives elucidates the logic of self-
reflection. Whenever one uses a sign to describe self’s own actor experience, the sign 
may carry self from an actor perspective to an observer perspective on that experience 
(as illustrated by Laura’s self-mediation). Equally, whenever one uses a sign to 
describe, or observe, the actions of others, the sign may carry self from this observer 
perspective to an empathetic actor participation in the actions of the other (which in 
Laura’s case leads to a short-circuit). 
Introducing the concept of the sign (or significant symbol) into our conception 
of complex semiotic systems entails abandoning the assumption that the complex 
semiotic systems ‘mirror’ the world, and instead conceptualizing these semiotic 
systems as architectures of intersubjectivity (Rommetveit, 1974) which enable the 
translation between actor and observer perspectives within a social act. Such a 
conception gives us considerable purchase on complex semiotic systems. 
Consider, for example, narratives. It has been argued by Nelson (2000) that 
the key to self-consciousness is awareness of self in time, and that this implies 
narratives. According to Nelson, the developing child is offered self-narratives, and 
by appropriating these, the child is able to conceptualize him/herself in time. 
Combining this with the present theoretical approach, we can say that before 
appropriating a narrative a child will have certain fields of undifferentiated (actor 
perspective) experience. For example, the child may have experienced the loss of a 
loved one, but have not reflective articulation of this experience. The narrative offered 
to the child provides an observer’s perspective on this actor experience of loss. And it 
is the integration of actor and observer perspectives, that enables the child to 
distanciate from the experience, and thus to become self-conscious of the loss. 
A similar dynamic is evident in Zittoun’s (this volume, section 2.3) analysis of 
Emma Bovary’s use of novels as a symbolic resource. Initially, Emma is embedded in 
the actor perspective of being in love. She feels exalted and has no self-reflective 
awareness of this experience. Then she thinks of some romance novels that she read. 
These provide her with an observer’s perspective on an other’s love. Combining the 
actor perspective (elation) with the observer perspective (on the love of others) results 
in the self-reflective awareness of herself being in love. Thus the narrative is not just a 
narrative that is analogical to self’s own experience, it is an intersubjective structure 
that enables translations between actor and observer perspectives. 
Partially integrated actor and observer perspectives are the pre-condition for 
self-reflection. Rupture, feedback, and social conflict can cause self-reflection 
because of a pre-existing, and only partially integrated, architecture of 
intersubjectivity. These social dynamics can provide the impetus for self-reflection, 
and thus have a part to play in constructing the architecture of intersubjectivity. 
However, these social dynamics, in themselves, cannot explain the semiotic process 
underlying self-reflection. The origin of self-reflection is not just in social interaction, 
but in social acts, or institutions, which provide structured actor and observer 
perspectives, and a mechanism for integrating these perspectives in the minds of 
individuals. 
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